There’s no right way to build a contending team in the off-season. Some teams sign marquee free-agents to long-term lucrative contracts in hopes of energizing the fanbase. This strategy has worked well for some teams, and it has not worked at all for others. This offseason, there has been a lot of pressure on the Mets to spend money for top-tier free agents.
The Mets have done this before, and it did work for a short period of time. It started in 2004 when General Manager Omar Minaya signed Pedro Martinez to a four-year, $53 Million contract. The following season, Minaya signed Carlos Beltran to a seven-year, $119 million contract. Minaya wasn’t done. He then worked out a trade that brought Carlos Delgado to Queens. The move also included taking on the rest of Delgado’s contract which was worth $48 million.
For the sake of brevity, I’m just going to list the next few moves:
● Johan Santana: Acquired via trade, contract extention of seven years, $137 million
● Luis Castillo: Four years, $25 million
● Oliver Perez: Three years, $36 million
● Francisco Rodriguez: Three years, $75 million
● Jason Bay: Four years, $66 million
Between 2004 and 2012, the Mets spent $559 million on eight players. They made the playoffs once in that time period. Five-hundred and fifty-nine million dollars for one post-season appearance and an NLDS title sounds awfully expensive. The Minaya tenure is a perfect example of the perils of signing players to lucrative long-term deals.
This type of strategy only works if the team is a consistent contender year in and year out. It has worked for the Yankees, but it hasn’t worked for teams like the Marlins, Blue Jays, and Angels. The long-term contracts eat up a lot of payroll for a long time, making it difficult to rebuild a team.
It’s fine for Alderson to consider making a big splash, but he can’t go all in. The smarter strategy would be to look at what teams like the Pirates and Red Sox have done. Both teams have had success in the past three years, and that’s because instead of making huge free-agent splashes, they decided to look for valuable role players at pretty low prices.
After dumping the majority of their payroll on the Dodgers during the 2012 trade deadline, the Red Sox bought into the idea of retooling through fringe type players. They signed Jonny Gomes to a two year, $10 million deal. Gomes turned into a nice, right-handed power option. They also brought in Shane Victorino on a three-year, $39 million deal. Victorino had a 5.6 WAR in 2013, and it was pretty cheap as it only cost the Red Sox $13 million. Finally, the Red Sox brought in Mike Napoli on a one-year, $5 million deal. Napoli was originally offered more money, but after discovering that the veteran catcher had a degenerative hip condition, the Red Sox reduced their offer. As a result of the condition, Napoli shifted over to first, and got the job done with 3.9 WAR. Again, that’s a pretty good value for only $5 million.
The Pirates used the same strategy of investing in fringe players. They signed Francisco Liriano to a two-year, $14 million deal. Liriano posted a FIP of 2.92 in 2013, and earned himself comeback player of the year honors for the second time in his career. They also signed catcher Russell Martin to a two-year, $17 million deal. Although Martin was not great with the bat — posting a Fangraphs Offense rating of 0.0 — he was fantastic on defense with a rating of 22.4. Studies also indicated that Russell Martin was one of the best pitch framers in the league this year.
The fringe strategy has worked for a lot of teams, however it is worth noting that both the Pirates and Red Sox had very good players on the team to begin with. The cheap additions served as ways to fill in holes with solid but not fantastic players. However, the Mets might not have the same base of talent that the Red Sox and Pirates had on their team prior to bringing in the cheaper role players. Alderson is probably going to have to use both of the strategies. He’s going to have to sign one big free-agent for a lot of money in order to increase the caliber of talent on the team. Then he is probably going to bring in cheaper role players to complement the big-time free agent.
Below is the ranking of the signing by what one WAR cost. (Rodriguez cost $33.5M not 75M)
Beltran: 31.2 WAR, $119, 3.8 WAR Cost
Martinez: 8.1,$53,6.5
Santana: 15.2, $137, 9.0
Delgado: 4.8, $48, 10.0
Rodriguez: 2.8, $33.5, 12.0
Castillo: 1.3, $25, 19.2
Bay: 1.4, $66, 47.1
Perez (0.6), $39, total loss
Beltran and Santana were the two longest contracts. Beltran’s was an above average return and Santana’s was more expensive mostly due to injury. Both were super stars when they signed. My conclusion is that if a player is a superstar then it is worth the risk within reason. If he is a pitcher I would be more reluctant but still would consider it. Of the players that the Mets are considering none are superstars so I wouldn’t consider a long term contract.
Pedro has the second best return and he also was a superstar and signed mid range. It bolsters the conclusion that superstars are worth the risk.
Next is the midrange (3-5 years) players and the three best at the time of signing were very good players, Delgado, Bay and Rodriguez. None brought back the intended value though. This is the current 2014 player that the Mets are considering. Very risky. It is also not worth the value of paying that high a price for a closer. Parnell is considered a very good closer yet a spring training invite saved 13 games for the Mets.
Castillo and Perez were basically Minaya’s folly and should never had been signed to those deals.
In 2014 the Mets need to fill holes but only “very good” players are available. Some of the new players will succeed and some will fail. Alderson needs to do his due diligence, not get caught in a long term deal, and be comfortable in his signings by signing the players that fit his model. Fill the holes with better players and the record will improve and the team will begin to be competitive. June 22- August 28 the Mets played 7 games above .500 without Wright, Harvey and Parnell for the majority of the time. It can be done.
My definition of large/med/small.
Large- 60million+ or AAV of 15+
Med-20-60 million or AAV of 10-15
Small-Under 20 million, AAV of less than 10.
You listed some successful small/med contract players, and I will list some unsuccessful ones.
Melky Cabrera (2/16, -0.9 fWAR)
Joe Blanton (2/15, -0.4 fWAR)
Ryan Ludwick (2/15, -0.8 fWAR)
Mike Adams (2/12, -0.4 fWAR)
Jeff Keppenginer(3/12, -1.5 fWAR)
Maicer Izturis (3/10, -2.1 fWAR)
Kyuji Fujikara (2/9, 0.2 fWAR)
Sean Burnett (2/8 , -0.1 fWAR)
Joakim Soria (2/8, 0.2 fWAR)
Brett Myers (1/7, -0.7 fWAR)
Scott Baker (1/5, -0.1 fWAR)
Ty Wigginton (2/5, -0.6 fWAR)
Looking at the list, it looks like one is more likely to bust than not. The Red Sox just got really lucky on their Free Agents.
“The Minaya tenure is a perfect example of the perils of signing players to lucrative long-term deals.”
I don’t agree with this at all. The Minaya tenure is the perfect example of not filling out the rest of your roster with scrubs. Beltran, Delgado and Santana combined for 14.5 fWAR in 2008 – the problem was starting guys like Ryan Church, Endy Chavez, Brian Schneider and Luis Castillo. Even with those guys, if Wagner doesn’t get hurt, the Mets make the playoffs.
@Brian, I think that’s a valid point. However, I think that line was referring to the big picture;the idea that the Mets spent a lot of money for a period of 5-6 years and only made the playoffs once.
I think it’s fair to say it’s disappointing that they didn’t make the playoffs more often but it’s not fair to say the reason they didn’t was because they spent a lot of money.