Outfield, what outfield?
Sandy Alderson uttered this line at the Winter Meeting early during his tenure, back when he either couldn’t, or wouldn’t, spend much more than the minimum to bring in players and his outfield was a borderline disaster.
Yet Alderson has consistently brought aboard outfielders, of various pay levels, and it’s remarkable how bad most of them have been. Here’s a list of the outfielders he signed or traded for that received a million-plus salary, how much he paid for them and what they delivered in their first year.
| Year | Name | Salary | fWAR |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | Scott Hairston | $1.1 | 0.3 |
| 2012 | Andres Torres | $2.7 | 1.4 |
| 2014 | Curtis Granderson | $14 | 1.2 |
| 2014 | Chris Young | $7.25 | (-0.7) |
| 2014 | Eric Young Jr. | $1.85 | 1.3 |
| 2015 | Michael Cuddyer | $8.5 | 0.0 |
| 2015 | John Mayberry Jr. | $1.45 | (-0.3) |
| 2016 | Alejandro De Aza | $5.75 | (-0.8) |
That’s eight players and not one of them managed to be a league-average player (2.0 fWAR) although this comes with a few caveats. Let’s look at them individually.
Hairston – Provided fine value for his salary and earned a return engagement in 2012.
Torres – Was worth his contract, even if it wasn’t a particularly good year.
Granderson – Had a great year in 2015 and could be worth his contract when all is said and done.
C. Young – Released mid-year and no one shed a tear.
E. Young – The Mets acquired him mid-year in 2013 but this was his first year on the Opening Day roster.
Cuddyer – The salary/production was bad enough but he also cost the Mets their first-round pick. At least he set the example of retiring early, which may come in handy soon.
Mayberry Jr. – Released mid-year and no one shed a tear.
De Aza – Signed to be a semi-regular and has had a much smaller role.
That’s eight outfielders paid $1 million or more and not one of them had a year that made fans get excited, with the possible exception of Hairston. It’s sort of remarkable, really. One would think that just by blind luck that one or two of these guys would have come in and put up a 2.5 fWAR type of year.
Everyone will point to one or more of the above transactions and say something along the lines of, “I was against that immediately; it was doomed to fail!” While not doubting the veracity of those statements – and not wishing for people to chime in with ones they knew would bust – a neutral, non-biased observer could see the logic in each move.
Clearly, just because a move had some logic to it doesn’t mean that it’s a foolproof idea. But if you took a coin and flipped it eight times, only once in 256 results would it come up heads each time. Obviously, bust/success isn’t a direct correlation to heads/tails but this should at least give some sort of ballpark of an idea how unlikely it was for all eight of these moves to fail to produce a league-average player.
Of course, the chart isn’t complete. In 2013, the Mets brought Marlon Byrd in on an NRI. He made the club and ended up getting paid $700,000 but produced a 3.5 fWAR before being dealt away. Of course, for many that will come with an asterisk, as Byrd already had a PED charge against him and recently he was served a 162-game suspension for a repeat violation.
But even if we ignore the potential cheating aspect, does a hit on an NRI make up for eight guys that you spent seven/eight figures on all failing to reach league-average status in their first year?
Let’s look at it a different way. Since not all of these guys were signed to be regulars, let’s compare the total expenditure versus the Dollar Value returned, as calculated by FanGraphs, and see if the Mets at least got their money’s worth on these $1 million players. Here are their Dollar Values earned:
SH – $2.1
AT – $9.1
CG – $9.5
CY – (-$5.2)
EY – $9.9
MC – ($0.3)
JM – ($2.1)
ADA – (-6.0)
Total – $17 million
So, the Mets paid $42.6 million and have received $17 million worth of production. That’s not good. There’s a chance to add to the production somewhat, if De Aza turns it on, or at least is less bad, for the rest of the year.
Now, let’s add Byrd to the equation. That brings the expenditure to $43.3 million and the return to $42.9 million, as Byrd produced $25.9 million of value before he was dealt. So, in a way, the hit on Byrd has essentially made up for the rest of the lot.
Did you ever hear of a guy named Cespedes? I think they traded for him last July and he’s been pretty good, I think. Please do not ignore all the facts when trying to make an argument because the argument then loses all it’s credibility. You don’t like Alderson, I get it ,but don’t twist or ignore the facts. Also, while all those you mentioned were signed as free agents and not traded for, you did use the word “traded for” in your second paragraph.
I like Alderson.
If I included EY, I should have included Cespedes – mea culpa.
Edit: In the second graph, I used the phrase, “signed or traded for”
Edit II: Andres Torres was traded for
Taking out EY, the seven remaining $1 million-plus guys combined for $40.75 million paid versus $7.1 million earned
Adding Cespedes, the nine $1 million-plus guys combined for $70.1 million paid versus $31.1 million earned. Obviously, Cespedes will likely add significantly to that amount. But not enough to make up the deficit.
Mathematically…. aren’t the Combined Average WAR or FWAR averages inherently Zero? Is the 2.0 Fwar for some segment of Players?…Starters?
No, the combined average is not inherently zero.
A 2.0 fWAR is an average starter.
OK…so it Refers to “Starters”— that makes more sense. .
Jaundicing the outcomes is the fact that several of those players were not signed as “Starters”— EY and Hairston and Mayberry were definitively Bench Enders.
CY and Torres were probably both signed as starter/platoons–and I won’t argue with any number that says they were lousy…they were!!!
Byrd was a sensational sign and they merchandized the Hell out of Him!!!
Cuddyer was a Tradgedy…. a completely Bad Signing!!!
Grandy has been ok…. it’s hard to argue against his value in 2015—even if it’s the last positive value.
DeAza has sucked….and he’s been used in a way that probably limits his success….he may still make them lucky.
“So, in a way, the hit on Byrd has essentially made up for the rest of the lot.”
…through the magic of cheating…
Would love to see how Alderson’s relief acquisitions stack up, LOL.
Byrd also contributed by bringing back Herrera and Black.
Alderson obviously doesn’t like spending money, and I get that. However, my problem with him is that de Aza’s position and Kelly Johnson’s position could have been filled by our youth. I don’t see where these players offer more than a kid could have. When Collins and Alderson speak of avoiding the mistakes of the youth, they also lose the energy that a young player brings. After all, there’s plenty of veterans on this team.
From the game on Sunday: You remember on the first sac bunt that Matz fielded on Sunday and threw it just wide of first into the runner and Johnson didn’t even really try for it and it went down the right field line? Keith Hernandez mused that he should have caught that, and I called it “a business decision” as Deion Sanders on NFL Network calls plays where the player won’t risk his well being to make a play. Johnson already is showing why he either signed with Atlanta or would have retired in January.
I fear to follow their foolish stereotyping of young players, they gave Morris away for a negative return player when T J Rivera just keeps hitting.
In some ways, quantitatively, it’s probably worse than you described.
1. In a catch 22 situation, some players got less and less playing time or were released because they weren’t producing, which limited the negative impact they caused the team. Had they gotten more playing time, their WAR numbers would have been even lower.
2. By releasing people, you not only have to eat their salary but you also have to pay the prorated salary for the replacement player that is going to take their roster spot, which should be factored into the cost.